Brussels Sprouts

On February 28, the United States launched Operation Epic Fury, a major military campaign against Iran carried out alongside Israeli strikes. The opening wave targeted Iranian command and control nodes, missile forces, and military infrastructure across multiple cities and included a decapitation strike that killed the supreme leader. The conflict quickly spread beyond Iran itself. Tehran has retaliated with missile and drone strikes across the Gulf, hitting U.S. and allied targets in countries including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and even striking the British military base in Cyprus. From Europe, the response has been sharply divided. Spain’s government has rejected what it called the “unilateral military action” by the United States and Israel and denied U.S. forces the use of Spanish bases for the operations. Sitting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in the White House, President Donald Trump slammed Spain’s position and threatened to cut off trade with Madrid. And Spain has

This week marks the four-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Brussels Sprouts wanted to mark this somber milestone with a look at the conflict and the ongoing efforts to secure a durable end to the war. Even as the war in Ukraine shows no signs of an imminent end, the international community, and the allies in Europe in particular, have been working on the foundations of a credible security guarantee for Ukraine once the fighting ends. Part of this line of effort has been the proposed creation of a multinational force, which could be deployed to Ukraine once the hostilities cease to serve as a visible reassurance force. Perhaps more critically, the multinational force could help Ukraine regenerate its military forces and strengthen its own ability to deter further Russian aggression. Led by the United Kingdom and France, the multinational force has the potential to be a key pillar of Ukraine's future security, yet there are lingering questions about what the force aims to do and how

This week’s episode of Brussels Sprouts picks up in the aftermath of the Munich Security Conference. The U.S. tone at Munich was notably more conciliatory than last year, as U.S. officials sought to calm anxieties. Secretary of State Marco Rubio received a standing ovation as he called European allies America’s oldest friends and cited the history of mutual defense from Korea to Afghanistan. But for many Europeans, the rhetoric did little to dispel deeper doubts about the trajectory of the transatlantic relationship.  Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was also at Munich, stepping onto the main stage against the backdrop of transatlantic strain. Wang used his presence to position China as a responsible global actor and a stabilizing force in a fragmented world. Notably, the sharp European rhetoric toward Beijing that defined previous conferences was more muted. As tensions with Washington have mounted, several European leaders, including Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and United Kingdom Prime M

Today’s Brussels Sprouts discussion follows on from our conversation last week on whether middle powers have the ability to chart a course more independent of the United States. Today, we delve into this question as it pertains to whether Europe can defend itself with significantly less U.S. presence in Europe—or none at all. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently addressed that question, saying that if anyone believes Europe or the European Union can defend itself without the United States, they are "dreaming.” In December, German newspaper Die Welt conducted a wargame simulating a Russian invasion of NATO, in partnership with military researchers at Helmut Schmidt University. During the exercise, Russian troops moved unchallenged through NATO territory for three days, capturing a Lithuanian city in the Suwałki Gap. The resulting analysis has cast serious doubt on whether European NATO states can defend their Baltic allies.   We are joined today by one of the wargame participants, Franz-Stefan Gady, as w

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made headlines at this year's World Economic Forum in Davos with his speech in which he declared that the international system is in the midst of a rupture—not a transition—and that middle powers must reduce their dependence on great powers such as the United States. Carney called for middle powers to diversify their partnerships and cooperate among themselves to hedge against rising uncertainty, and great powers' weaponization of interdependence. Carney asserted that the middle powers must act together because “if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.”   Carney's speech was praised far and wide, with many crediting him for calling out what many have been feeling, especially in the last year under the Trump administration. What remains to be seen, however, is whether middle powers like Canada and its transatlantic partners will truly be able to form the new partnerships needed to reduce their dependence on the United States and navigate changing geopolitical realities

It has been a tumultuous month in the transatlantic alliance. This week, President Donald Trump’s demands to take control of Greenland reached a fever pitch. On Sunday, President Trump threatened major tariffs on Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and a host of other American allies in Europe to coerce them to accept his demands for U.S. control over Greenland. For many European allies, Trump crossed a line, and allies raised the prospect of using their anticoercion instrument against the United States. Though Trump posted on Wednesday afternoon that he had negotiated a “framework deal” to avert the crisis with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, much damage was already done. Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave a speech at the World Economic Forum annual meeting at Davos declaring the end of the era of decisive U.S. global leadership, Trump launched the Board of Peace for Gaza—to which he invited Russian President Vladimir Putin—and Putin ordered more missile and drone strikes on Ukr

Since the invasion of Ukraine, European states have taken major steps to rebuild their defense industrial bases, both to supply Ukraine and to rebuild their own militaries. Europe has been spending heavily on defense since 2022, but the Trump administration’s demand for European NATO members to take responsibility for the conventional defense of the continent has spurred further investments. Add in the Trump administration’s bellicose rhetoric around Greenland and public doubts about the reliability of America in NATO, plus the dual challenges of a resurgent Russia and a wavering United States, and the push for European officials to integrate their defenses further only grows. As European states continue to rearm in 2026, they face the prospect of rebuilding their militaries, supporting Ukraine, and deterring Russia with less U.S. support.     The new year has already shown a propensity for the unexpected. To help take stock of the way ahead for European security in 2026, we are excited to welcome Sophia Besc

On January 3, the United States apprehended the sitting president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, and brought him to the United States to face trial for drug trafficking. In the aftermath of the operation, President Trump and other senior officials in his administration have threatened similar aggression against Mexico and Cuba and revived rhetoric about the United States “needing” Greenland. The operation and Washington’s posture have sent shockwaves through the international system, as concerns rise about the resilience of international law and the risk that the world is moving toward a global order based on spheres of influence, where might makes right and authoritarian states like Russia and China sense a freer hand within their respective regions. The Trump administration’s comments about Greenland are putting additional stress on transatlantic relations, with the Danish prime minister making clear that any U.S. attack on Greenland would end the NATO alliance. To help make sense of the geopolitical implica

This week Brussels Sprouts breaks down the latest negotiations on Ukraine. American officials told reporters that they had resolved or closed gaps around 90 percent of their differences with Ukraine on a draft agreement to end the war. Territory and security guarantees remain the key sticking points. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said it would be impossible for Ukraine to give up territory that Russia has not taken on the battlefield, while Russia has not dropped its demands to control the territories it illegally annexed. On the security guarantees front, the United States and Europe sound optimistic that progress is being made. The latest plan seems to envision an 800,000-strong peacetime Ukrainian military, U.S.-provided intelligence and monitoring to track any attempts to breach the peace agreement, and a European-led multinational force that would be stationed in Ukraine but away from the front lines to bolster confidence. However, it is highly unlikely that Russia will agree to this plan

On December 4th, the Trump administration released its long-awaited national security strategy, sending another round of shock waves through the transatlantic community. The national security strategy acknowledges that Europe remains strategically vital to the United States and doubles down on the need for Europe to take more responsibility for its defense, but the strategy is unique in its condemnation of allies, focus on “civilizational erasure”, and promise to intervene to “help Europe correct its current trajectory.” While the 2017 National Security Strategy explicitly laid out several threats Russia poses to American interests, this one makes little mention of Russia except for calls to restore strategic stability. Many of America's European allies are feeling unsettled and concerned about the national security strategy and what it means for transatlantic relations. So, to help us understand the new national security strategy, it differs from Trump's first strategy and where the through lines are, we're

It has been almost a year since Russia and Iran signed their comprehensive strategic partnership. That deal established a 20-year partnership between the two countries covering the full spectrum of their relationship from military to economic to cyber ties. Though the two countries have cooperated deeply, from mass production of military drones to smuggling millions of barrels of oil, Russia did not come to Iran's aid when Iran endured 12 days of punishing war at the hands of Israel and the United States. Despite this, cooperation between Russia and Iran has continued. In November, Financial Times reported that Iranian scientists and nuclear experts made a second covert visit to Russia last year in what the United States claims has been a push to obtain sensitive technologies with potential nuclear weapon applications. Cooperation between the two remains a significant challenge for the United States and its allies.   To take stock of where Russia-Iran relations are and where they may go, the Center for a New

Over the last month, nuclear tensions have been heating up. In late October, Vladimir Putin claimed two achievements: the successful test of a nuclear-powered missile known as Burevestnik and the initial test of an unmanned nuclear-powered submarine known as Poseidon. Both systems theoretically have unlimited range, and both are capable of hosting nuclear warheads. Shortly thereafter, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would resume nuclear testing on an equal basis with Russia and China. This week on Brussels Sprouts, concerns around the world of a revived nuclear arms race are growing. Between Putin’s nuclear testing, inflamed rhetoric from President Trump, and the looming expiration of the New START Arms Control Treaty between Russia and the United States in February 2026, the mounting evidence paints a concerning picture. To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Corey Hinderstein and Jon Wolfsthal to Brussels Sprouts.  Corey Hinders

America’s allies are cooperating in a growing variety of domains. In their recent Foreign Affairs piece, former NATO Ambassador Julie Smith and former National Security Council Senior Director Lindsey Ford argue that the United States should support and facilitate cooperation among America’s European and Indo-Pacific allies. In a world where U.S. adversaries are deepening their cooperation, it is no longer sufficient to ask allies to just focus on their own respective geographic corners of the world. Smith and Ford argue that cooperation between American allies stands to benefit American grand strategy.   This week on Brussels Sprouts, if the United States fails to capitalize on the already present trend of growing cooperation, Washington risks self-isolation and an inability to effectively manage challenges in a world where the lines between Asia and Europe are blurring and crises on one continent have spillover effects on the other.  To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very

President Donald Trump’s meeting with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping on October 30, 2025, ended with a temporary truce between the two leaders. While this may be good news for the U.S.-China relationship in the short term, no formal comprehensive trade agreement followed, and any number of issues could derail the delicate truce. Europe has long sought to balance its ideological opposition to China with the desire for pragmatic trade and diplomatic relations.  This week on Brussels Sprouts, while European nations have largely aligned with the United States in restricting trade with China, could the recent U.S.-China trade thaw lead Brussels to pursue a similar rapprochement?  To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Liz Economy and Mikko Huotari to Brussels Sprouts. Liz Economy is a principal with WestExec Advisors and a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution Mikko Huotari is the executive director of the Mercator Insti

Are we in a new Cold War? That is the question Mike McFaul takes on in his new book, Autocrats versus Democrats: Russia, China, America, and the New Global Disorder. McFaul argues that modern analogies to a second Cold War hold some merit but are insufficient given the rise of authoritarian tendencies within the United States and European democracies. Combining analysis of the Russian and Chinese threats with a critique of the Trump administration's isolationist and authoritarian tendencies, McFaul articulates a set of policy prescriptions that sketch a new grand strategy for American engagement with the world. Dr. Michael McFaul is the Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and a Professor of International Studies at Stanford University

The Trump administration made a major move this week in its announcement of sanctions on major Russian oil companies Rosneft and Luke Oil, along with 31 subsidiaries. This follows President Donald Trump’s cancellation of a discussed meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Budapest and a U.S. agreement to allow Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to strike targets deeper inside Russia. Some have suggested that European leaders are feeling some satisfaction that their repeated interventions with Trump on behalf of Ukraine have finally produced American pressure on Moscow. This week on Brussels Sprouts, how can Europe navigate escalating Russian attacks on Ukraine and hybrid threats from Moscow while keeping the United States on side? To discuss this and more, the Center for a New American Security is very pleased to welcome Daniela Schwarzer and Natalie Tocci to Brussels Sprouts. Daniela Schwarzer is a board member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung and one of Germany's leading experts on European and intern

Four years into its war in Ukraine, Russia continues to escalate attacks on the Ukrainian population while also dialing up its hybrid campaign against Europe. In the last six weeks alone, Russia has sent military drones into Polish and Romanian airspace and fighter aircraft into Estonian airspace and has continued its influence operations in places like Moldova and Czechia. The Russian military threat appears to be growing: German intelligence has stated that Russia “will not shy away from a direct military confrontation with NATO,” and the European Commission proposed a roadmap to prepare Europe for war by 2030. Yet that is only one side of the story. Russia has not come close to an operational breakthrough in Ukraine, and its economy is increasingly strained. Ukraine has struck 21 of Russia’s 38 large oil refineries since the start of this year, disrupting as much as 40 percent of the country’s oil refining capacity. Gasoline prices in Russia have spiked nearly 10 percent. In many ways, this is a tale of tw

On the surface, great power competition often seems driven by economic and military conflict, but diplomacy has always been central to great powers' engagement with the world. This is the argument made by Dr. Wess Mitchell in his forthcoming book, Great Power Diplomacy, The Skill of Statecraft from Attila the Hun to Kissinger. Covering 15 centuries of history, the book makes a powerful case that diplomacy is an essential tool of great power politics and leaders ignore diplomatic skill at their own peril. With the press of current events and especially the rise of cooperation across the Axis of Upheaval, the book is more relevant than ever. We are very delighted to welcome the book's author, Wess Mitchell, to Brussels Sprouts. A. Wess Mitchell is a scholar of international relations, a principal at the Marathon Initiative, and he served as the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia from 2017 to 2019.

On September 28th, Moldovan voters went to the polls in parliamentary elections to choose between competing visions for their country's future. Despite intense efforts by the Kremlin to influence the information space, wage cyber attacks on election infrastructure, and even make bomb threats at diaspora polling places in Europe, the pro-EU party of action and solidarity clinched just over 50 % of the vote, defeating the pro-Russia patriotic electoral bloc's 24%. The pro-EU party will command a parliamentary majority without needing to form a coalition government. This, coupled with pro-EU President Maya Sandu's victory in last year's presidential election, maintains Moldova's path towards the EU. But persistent challenges remain. Economic growth remains sluggish, poverty remains high, and the pro-Russian enclave of Transnistria remains a challenge from Moldova's EU accession hopes. To help us understand and decode the election results and what they mean for Moldova and the future of Russian influence in its p

Over the last two weeks, Russia has repeatedly violated NATO airspace. Seventeen Russian military drones entered Polish airspace on September 10th, followed by another drone in Romania, three Russian jets flew into Estonian airspace for 12 minutes on September 19th, and drones of unknown origin shut down airports in Copenhagen and Oslo on September 22nd. In response to Russia's initial incursion, NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry to increase and coordinate NATO efforts to counter Russia's drone threat. A new CNAS report released on September 10th details the tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to counter drones and finds current American drone capabilities lacking. NATO's counter-drone capabilities are not sufficient at present and urgent action is needed to prepare NATO militaries to counter Russian drone-based threats. Here to discuss the way forward with us is CNAS's own Dr. Stacy Pettyjohn, who's the co-author of the new CNAS report, and a Brussels Sprouts regular, Michael Kofman. Stacie Pet